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Abstract 
 
This paper presents empirical estimates of a gravity model of bilateral migration that properly 
accounts for non-linearities and tackles causality issues through an instrumental variables 
approach. In contrast to the existing literature, which is limited to OECD data, we have estimated 
our model using a matrix of bilateral migration stocks for 127 countries. We find that the 
inverted-U relationship between income at origin and migration found by other authors survives 
the more demanding bilateral specification but does not survive both instrumentation and 
introduction of controls for the geographical and cultural proximity between country pairs. We 
also evaluate the effect of migration on origin and destination country income using the 
geographically determined component of migration as a source of exogenous variation and fail to 
find a significant effect of migration on origin or destination income. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1. Introduction 
How migration affects—and is affected by—development remains one of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary policy debates. Advocates of greater openness towards 
immigration argue that international movements of persons contribute to development at 
home and destination by eliminating differences in marginal products across regions. 
Opponents, on the other hand, contend that the labor market effects of migration at 
destination can adversely affect the bases of social cohesion, while the loss of skilled workers 
at origin can deteriorate the chances of poor countries of sustaining the provision of goods 
that are basic for development.1 At the same time, any analysis of the migration-
development nexus is made particularly complex by the fact that we expect migration to be 
affected by the home and destination country’s economic prosperity. 
In this paper, we try to evaluate the magnitude and form of these links through an 
empirical analysis of bilateral migration stocks. Seeking to answer whether and how income 
and emigration influence one another, we quantitatively analyze the drivers and effects of 
migration with a particular focus on bidirectional chains of causality using an instrumental 
variables approach. To study whether migration causes income we use the geographically-
induced variations in migration across countries as our source of exogenous variations. 
Conversely, to study whether income causes migration we use the variation in European 
settler mortality rates as a source of exogenous variation in levels of development. 
A careful identification of the multiple potential links of causation between 
development and income is relevant not only to academic debate, but also to current policy 
discussions in both developing and developed countries. Many policymakers in developed 
countries argue that one—if not the only—way of curbing immigration pressure ‘here’ is to 
foster economic development ‘there’. This approach depicts immigration as a problem and 
                                                 
1 For the argument in favor of migration, see UNDP (2009), World Bank (2006), and World Bank (2009). For 
critiques, see Borjas (1999), Chen and Boufford (2005), Mills, et al (2008), and UNCTAD (2007). 
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lack of development as its root cause.2 Yet, historical and ongoing international migration 
patterns point to a more complex picture. For most of the countries that are experiencing a 
rise in living standards, economic development may well be associated with higher 
emigration rates, at least until a certain development level is achieved.3 For example, the 
median emigration rate in countries with low levels of human development is 3.66, in 
contrast to that in countries with high levels of human development—7.18.4 Because of these 
patterns, some historians and migration scholars have hypothesized the existence of an 
inverted-U relationship between development and emigration based on either cross-sectional 
or time-series comparisons.5  
However, simply observing that development and emigration appear to display such a 
non linear-relationship leaves important questions unanswered. First of all, it is not hard to 
come up with a story in which such a relationship is generated by reverse causation. Further, 
even if the relationship reflects causation from development to migration, one must wonder 
what it is about the process of development that impacts individuals’ propensity to leave or 
stay. It may be rising income, but it may also be other socioeconomic and demographic 
changes brought about by, contributing to, or simply associated with rising income. 
Ultimately, people don’t just take a decision to migrate.  They decide to migrate to another 
country, which is why one should try to take into account the characteristics of receiving 
and sending countries, as well as of the idiosyncratic forces affecting pairs of countries in any 
                                                 
2 For instance, in 2005, European Commission’s President José Manuel Barroso stated, on the occasion of the EC 
approval of the European Union Strategy for Africa that “the problem of immigration, the dramatic 
consequences of which we are witnessing, can only be addressed effectively in the long term through an 
ambitious and coordinated Development cooperation to fight its root causes”, and the following year Nicolas 
Sarkozy, then France’s Interior Minister, stated in Rabat, Morocco, that “the development of Africa is the only 
solution, the only answer to the challenge of immigration”. 
3A country’s emigration rate in a given year is defined as its emigrant population as a share of its total native 
born population (at home and abroad) in that particular year. 
4We use the Human Development Report’s country groups by levels of the home development, which is 
indexed by the HDI as follows: low, 0.000-0.499; medium, 0.500-0.799; high, 0.800-0.899; and very high, 0.900-
1.000. See UNDP (2009), which also refers to the last group as “developed” countries. Note that high human 
development countries are not considered developed countries but are rather the highest HDI group among 
developing countries. 
5 See, for example, Hatton and Williamson (1994) and de Haas (2007). 
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complete migration model (e.g., the distance between them, the existence or absence of a 
common border or language, the nature and strength of their historical ties). To take a simple 
example, over 11% of Mexicans are living abroad, compared to 2% of Argentines, despite the 
similar levels of development shared in both countries.6 The fact that Mexico shares a 
common border with the United States, while Argentina does not share a common border 
with any developed country is surely part of the explanation. The impact of such effects will 
not be captured in any cross-national empirical exercise that lumps together migrants that 
are going to very different places. Disentangling and estimating the effects of these various 
factors in driving and shaping emigration at the global level constitutes the first objective of 
this paper. 
Before exposing our strategy and presenting detailed results, it is important to discuss 
how we can think and what we know about both chains of causation. Let us first turn to the 
effect of development on the incentive and propensity to out-migrate, focusing on the 
potential effect of income. Take the example of a young Turkish woman who considers 
migrating to Germany but ends up accepting a job in a newly-established joint-venture, and 
consider alternatively the case of a young man in Bamako who after operating a cyber-café 
for a few years uses his savings to join his relatives in France. The former example is 
consistent with the idea that economic development reduces the incentive for emigration by 
expanding opportunities at home. The latter case illustrates the opposite view: economic 
development increases individuals’ financial propensity to emigrate by alleviating liquidity 
constraints on movement. 
These ideas can be represented through a very simple model illustrating the 
mechanisms that may generate a non-linear relationship between income and development. 
An individual decides to migrate by comparing utility of income, y, at home,  Uyo  , and at 
destination,  Uyd  , with the cost of migrating, c. For simplicity, we use a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function of the form  Uy  y  ,  0    1  . The migrant is prevented from moving 
                                                 
6 Mexico has an HDI of 0.854 and Argentina has an HDI of 0.866. 
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if the cost of migration is greater than income at origin, so we must have  c ≤ yo .   Suppose 
also that there is a randomly distributed term  e  U0,b  , which is the net gain in income 
at destination and will vary across individuals. Let  b  c  . We also assume for simplicity that 
all individuals have the same income  yo   at origin. It follows that an individual migrates if  
Uyd  e  Uyo  c  , subject to  c  yo  . This result yields two possible outcomes: 
1) If  yo   is sufficiently low, then the cost of moving is too great and emigration is 
zero. 
2) If  yo ≥ c  , then the fraction of people migrating will be given by the integral 

yo
yde
Uydy  
yo
yde
ydy
 11   y
1 |yo
yde
 11   yd  e
1 − yo1 
(1) 
As  yo   increases, the fraction of people who migrate decreases. For higher income at 
origin, there must be a greater net gain of migration to incite movement. The migration 
hump is represented by Eq. (1) and illustrated in Figure 1. 
fyo 
0 if yo  c
1
1 yd  e1 − yo1  if yo ≥ c
(2) 
 The preceding discussion illustrates that it is very important to consider non-
linearities in the study of the effect of income on migration. The idea that over some range of 
the development process development and emigration may go hand-in-hand has been 
presented by various authors in the past. Hatton and Williamson (1998, 2003) show that 
many countries that are highly developed7 today (e.g., Ireland, England, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and the Republic of Korea) experienced rising emigration rates in the past. As these 
countries grew wealthier, they also became more attractive to migrants from less developed 
                                                 
7 See UNDP (2009). 
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countries and were ultimately transformed from net emigration to net immigration countries 
over a few decades.  
Other authors have pointed out that this non-linear relationship also characterizes the 
cross-sectional data.8  In fact, around 2000, the emigration rate of Morocco, a middle income 
country with per capita GDP (PPP) of roughly $4,000, was twice as high (8.1%) as Niger’s 
4.0% (with a per capita GDP of less than $2,000) and Norway’s (3.9%), which has one of the 
world’s highest GDP per capita (close to $50,000 in 2007). Using Human Development Index 
(HDI) categories yields a similar picture (Figure 2).  
Anticipating our strategy and results, we can also point to the fact that in our OLS 
regressions, the coefficients on origin income and origin income squared retain their 
significance even when adding other variables, and that their respective signs (positive for 
the former, negative for the latter) do confirm the existence of an inverted-U relationship 
between income at origin and emigration. Overall, these facts strongly suggest that economic 
development and (e)migration do tend to go hand-in-hand—i.e. are positively correlated—at 
least up to a certain level of development, rather than what is typically posited in policy 
circles. The results of our OLS regression (1) indicate that 75% of countries in our sample are 
located on the upward sloping portion of the hump.  
But the model that we sketched above suggests that comparisons that are only 
centered on origin countries may be missing a fundamental part of the picture. In fact, 
equation (2) predicts that both income at origin and destination countries matter and that 
they matter nonlinearly. This suggests that models of migration that use either (i) a cross-
sectional analysis with countries as the unit of observation and thus do not distinguish 
between migration among different country-pairs, or (ii) a simple linear relationship where 
migration either increases or decreases with income levels or differentials, may be severely 
mis-specified. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to address these 
two specification issues simultaneously. 
                                                 
8 See, in particular, de Haas (2007). 
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 A third issue that arises in the analysis of how migration evolves with development is 
that we would also expect migration to have an effect on economic efficiency and income.  
These effects may differ by level of development. For example, emigration may foster 
economic growth among poorer countries where it can alleviate labor market pressures 
while providing much-needed revenue and foreign-exchange via remittances. However, in 
countries with higher levels of income and overall development (including better education 
systems), high rates of emigration could result in the loss of human capital that is necessary 
for the development of high-technology industries and overall further development progress. 
Such a pattern would generate an inverted-U relationship between migration and income 
that would nevertheless not reflect causation from income to migration. 
This paper attempts to deal with the need to understand the migration-development 
nexus through an analysis of bilateral migration stocks that takes nonlinearities in origin and 
destination income seriously while simultaneously tackling issues of causality through the 
use of convincing instruments. This is achieved by estimating a model of bilateral migration 
stocks using the World Bank/Sussex Database of Bilateral Migrant Stocks9 (hereafter the 
Sussex matrix) from which we extract information on bilateral migrant stocks for 127 
countries. We deal with the endogeneity of income to emigration using European Settler 
Mortality (ESM) rates as instruments for income to isolate its exogenous component and 
potential causal effect on emigration. Our research builds on the work of Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) (hereafter, AJR), who have shown that ESM rates explain 
contemporary differences in development through their effect on past and present-day 
institutions. Subsequently, we deal with the endogeneity of emigration by constructing the 
geographically-determined fraction of bilateral migrant stocks from our gravity model of 
bilateral stocks and using them as instruments to estimate the effect of migration on income 
both at origin and at destination for the 127 countries in our sample.  
                                                 
9  Migration DRC (2007). 
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Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, we confirm in the model of 
bilateral flows the existence of a robust non-linear inverted-U relationship between income 
at origin and emigration. Thus the migration ‘hump’ pattern exists in the more demanding 
empirical specification of bilateral migration stocks. Second, we show that the relationship 
survives in the simplest of our instrumental variables specifications. The relation appears to 
be particularly fragile to controlling for destination country income and variables capturing 
the economic, historical and cultural proximity between source and destination countries. 
Third, when we study the effect of migration on income we do not find a robust effect on 
either origin or destination income. This supports the idea that migration is not an important 
contributor nor hindrance to development and that may be best seen in terms of the 
expanded opportunities that it offers individuals to carry out their life plans.10 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the current state of 
knowledge on international migration patterns, especially those works that have focused on 
the migration-development nexus and/or used gravity models of migration. In section three, 
we present our strategy and data. Our results are exposed and discussed in section four. 
Section five concludes.  
2. Theoretical and Literature Review  
The migration-development nexus has received considerable attention in the 
literature. This section focuses on two sets of studies in the field: those that have analyzed 
the empirical relationship between income and development using national-level data, and 
those that have used gravity models to analyze the determinants and/or effects of 
migration—often understood as immigration. Our paper is at their intersection of these two 
literatures. 
A considerable body of work has dealt with the non-linear relationship that 
characterizes the effect of development on migration. The term ‘migration hump’ seems to 
have been coined by Martin (1993) when discussing the likely effects of NAFTA (North 
                                                 
10 See UNDP (2009), Chapter 1. 
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American Free Trade Agreement) on irregular migration from Mexico to the United States. 
Martin argued that NAFTA would stimulate migration in the short to medium run by 
fostering labor supply and mobility—especially from rural areas—before eventually reducing 
the incentives to out-migrate as the income gap narrowed with the United States. Martin and 
Taylor (1996) further argued that the process of social and economic development in its 
broadest sense tended to be associated with generally higher levels of mobility by helping 
would-be migrants pay for the fixed costs associated with migration. Only after a longer 
period of sustained growth and decreasing wage gaps between origin and destination 
countries would labor migration tend to decrease. According to them, emigration would tend 
to decrease steeply when the income ratio between receiving and sending countries declines 
from 4 or 5 to 1. Increasing income inequality would also increase people’s incentives to 
migrate abroad even if average income increases. 
These authors also underlined the fact that the downward-sloping portion of the 
migration hump was by no means inevitable if economic growth did not result in significant 
employment opportunities, in which case it could result in a semi-permanent ‘migration 
plateau’ of sustained out-migration that could last for an undetermined period of time. 
Olesen (2002) introduced the notion of a migration ‘band’ to refer to the income range 
associated with the highest emigration rates between two countries. Olesen (2002) posited 
that bilateral migration should peak and then decrease when the income differential between 
the sending and the receiving countries reaches and subsequently falls below a ratio of 
between 3 and 4.5 to 1, which he terms the ‘migration turning point’. More recently, de Haas 
(2007) discusses how policies of rich countries that seek to stem migration by helping foster 
development are ill-founded. As the poorest are empowered through economic and human 
development, they will tend to move to more developed countries to realize even greater 
gains, thus increasing migration rates over the short and medium terms. Hatton and 
Williamson (1994, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and Massey (1988, 1990, 2003) have also pointed 
to historical evidence illustrating the same key fact: at low levels of income, development 
seems to foster emigration.  
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Frequently applied in the study of international trade, gravity models have also been 
applied to analyze the drivers of migration and how, in turn, migration affects income. As 
the name suggests, gravity models are loosely derived from Newton’s law of gravitational 
force and posit that the interaction between two geographic entities, through trade or 
migration, are subject to forces that are inversely proportional to the distance (or income 
differential) between them and on some relevant measure of their ‘masses’, including 
population, area and/or income. Gravity models also typically include other geographical 
controls, such as whether the country is landlocked and distance to the equator, as well as 
bilateral controls that capture ‘pair-specific’ characteristics (e.g., whether two countries share 
a common border, a common language, and a colonial past). The central premise behind 
these models is that these structural features are likely to determine a country’s international 
trade and migration patterns.  
The application of gravity models to the analysis of trade goes back to Tinbergen 
(1962) and Linneman (1966). Since then, gravity models have been widely used by 
researchers, including Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1995), Frankel 
and Romer (1999), Egger (2000), and Carrillo and Li (2002). Under quite similar assumptions 
on the effects of geographical and other structural factors on population movement, gravity 
models have also been used to study international migration.11 The overwhelming majority 
of these studies have concentrated on OECD countries and used data on flows. Lewer and 
Van den Berg (2008), for instance, estimated a series of gravity equations using panel data for 
16 OECD countries for the period 1991–2000. Their regressions estimated bilateral flows 
between countries, controlling for their populations, the distance between them, the ratio of 
their per capita incomes, the pre-existing stock of foreign-born migrants, common language, 
geographical contiguity (common border) and colonial ties. Other controls were also added 
                                                 
11 According to Lewer and Van den Berg (2008) for instance, “Immigration, like international trade, is driven by 
the attractive force between immigrant source and destination countries and impeded by the costs of moving 
from one country to another”, which “(…) are likely to be correlated with the physical distance between 
countries”, while “(…) ceteris paribus, the more people there are in a source country, the more people are likely 
to migrate, and the larger the population in the destination country, the larger is the labor market for 
immigrants.” 
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in different specifications, such as variables for human capital and the rule of law. Their 
results confirmed that international migration is indeed subject to and driven by 
‘gravitational-like’ forces.  
More recently, Mayda (2008) and Ortega and Peri (2009) have estimated gravity 
models of international migration to developed countries. While their objectives and 
specifications differ, both papers focus on international migration flows to a subset of OECD 
countries for the period 1980-1995 (Mayda, 2008) and 1980-2005 (Ortega and Peri, 2009). 
The authors also use panel data drawn from the OECD’s International Migration Statistics 
based on OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI).  
Mayda’s results are broadly consistent with the main theoretical predictions of 
international migration theories. According to her findings, immigration flows are positively 
correlated to the destination countries’ GDP per worker. However, the effect of GDP per 
worker is not found to be statistically significant. These contrasting results emphasize the 
importance of so-called ‘pull factors’ in driving international migration. They also underline 
the complex nature of the relationship between origin country GDP and emigration, as low 
income constitutes both an incentive and an impediment to movement.  
Geographic and demographic factors also appear to play a major role. Hatton and 
Williamson (1998, 2003) and Mayda’s (2008) results suggest that the share of the origin 
country’s population aged 15-29 has a significant positive impact on outmigration (as a share 
of the population). Restrictive immigration policies are found to partly offset the effect of 
other push and pull factors, as, for instance, the impact of distance is greater when policies 
are relaxed. These findings suggest that ‘migration quotas matter’12 and that the ‘asymmetric 
effect’ between destination and home countries GDP is explained by the positive impact of 
economic growth at destination on policy stance towards immigration.  
A concern in most empirical studies of income is endogeneity. Mayda (2008) deals 
with the endogeneity of income by relating current emigration rates to lagged values of 
                                                 
12 p. 17. 
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income and then controlling for the endogeneity of income levels with terms of trade as an 
instrument. This approach would be valid only if were assumed that terms of trade have no 
direct effect on migration aside from its effect through lagged income, which would not be 
the case if migrants go to work in significant numbers to tradable-producing industries 
which are made more profitable by a terms of trade shock.   
All of these papers concentrate on the migration-development nexus in OECD 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies analyzing the effect of income 
on migration using bilateral migration flows which include migration to developing 
countries, and this paper is the first attempt to study the effect of development on migration 
using data on migrants from and to both developing and developed countries. This is striking 
because migration to non-OECD countries accounts for 51 percent of international migration 
and for 65 percent of all international migration originating in non-OECD countries.13    
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have previously used bilateral 
migration models to study the effect of migration on income. Both use geographical factors as 
instruments, as we do. Ortega and Peri (2009) use the share of migration explained by 
geography and demography as an instrument for total migration. However, their study is 
limited to OECD migration data and only examines the effect of migration on destination 
income—it is thus silent on the effect of migration on development as such. Felbermayr et al. 
(2008) use the Sussex matrix of bilateral migration stocks (which we also use) to study the 
effect of migration on income in both developed and developing countries. Similarly to us, 
they use an IV technique inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999) to test the effect of 
immigration on per capita income. They find that a positive and statistically significant effect 
whereby their preferred specification suggests that a 10% increase in the number of migrants 
leads to a 2.2% gain in per capita income. Our paper shows, however, that this effect is not 
robust to adequately controlling for the endogeneity of institutions (Rodrik, et al, 2004). 
                                                 
13 Migration DRC (2007). 
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3.  Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Empirical Model 
3.1.1. OLS 
In order to test for the migration ‘Hump’, we use the following empirical 
specification: 
lnΓ ij  0  1S i  2R j  3Pij  ij (3) 
where  Γ ij   is the estimated stock of individuals born in country i living in country j; 
S i   is a vector of country-specific variables of the sending country i; R j   is a vector of 
country-specific variables of the receiving country j; P ij   is a vector of pairwise variables 
between the sending country i and receiving country j; and  ij   is an iid error term for 
sending-receiving country pair ij. The variables that constitute S, R, and P are discussed 
below with a full list and sources in Table A1. 
3.1.2. Two­stage least squares 
To control for the endogeneity of income we use ESM rates and its square. As AJR 
(2001) demonstrates, ESM rates are correlated with past and present day institutions and thus 
with present-day development.14 As a result, they are exogenous to present development and 
serve as an excellent candidate for an instrument. In order to use ESM as a valid instrument 
for income, the one condition that we would have to accept is that they do not have an 
independent effect on migration over and above that which they have on income. This 
assumption may be questionable in the simplest specifications in which we do not control for 
current institutions, as in such a case ESM may be correlated with the disturbance term. 
However, once we control for institutions as well as a host of other country-specific 
variables—and verify that the instrument maintains explanatory power in the first stage 
                                                 
14 In contrast to AJR (2001), in order to maintain both developed and developing countries in our sample, we set 
ESM to zero for countries that have never been colonies. 
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regressions (see Table 2)—the hypothesis of a direct effect of ESM on current migration 
appears much less tenable. In an alternative specification, we also include former colonial 
status in the list of instruments. Again, excludability of this instrument may be questioned 
but is less likely a problem in our most demanding specifications which also include colony-
colonizer pair dummies in the explanatory variables of the second stage regression.  
3.2. The ‘Horserace': income and migration 
Following a framework similar to that established by Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi (2004), we explore whether or not migration plays as prominent a role in a cross-
sectional analysis of income as other factors, namely institutions, trade, and geography. 
3.2.1. OLS 
Using OLS, we estimate the following empirical specification: 
lnyi  0  1Inst i  2Tradei  3Geoi  4Migi  i  
 (4) 
where i is the country index; y measures income; Inst, Trade, and Geo measure the 
quality of institutions, the prevalence of trade, and geographical characteristics, respectively. 
Mig represents alternatively immigration or emigration ratios (that is, the ratio of migrants 
and destination or origin population), which we estimate separately. As above,  i   is an iid 
error term. 
3.2.2. Two­stage least squares 
In Eq. (4), we deal with the likely endogeneity of institutions, trade, and migration 
using instrumental variables. In keeping with the Rodrik, et al (2004) approach, we use ESM 
rates as an instrument for institutions and the Frankel-Romer measure of openness for trade. 
For both immigration and emigration, we use the migration ratios explained by geographical 
variables, which we know to be exogenous. More precisely, we use the predicted values of 
regressing the stock of migrants only on the geographical variables of the model:  
                                                                                                        14 
lnΓ ij  0  1Dist ij  2Borderij  3AbsLat i  4Landi  5Landj  ij (5) 
where Dist is the distance between origin country i and destination country j; Border 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise; AbsLat is 
the absolute latitude of origin country i; and Land is a dummy equal to 1 if the respective 
country is landlocked and 0 otherwise. The predicted values,  Γ̂ ij  , are then summed 
separately for each origin and destination country, 
∑
j1
k−1
Γ̂ ij  Γ̂ i and ∑
i1
k−1
Γ̂ ij  Γ̂ j,
(6) 
where  k  181  , the total number of countries in our sample. 
Thus,  Γ̂ i   and  Γ̂ j   represent the geography-predicted components of immigrant and 
emigrant stocks, respectively. For a single country,  i  , which has both an immigrant and 
emigrant stock, we write  Γ̂ iI   and  Γ̂ iE  , using obvious notation. Dividing those by 
population, we derive exogenous instruments for immigration and emigration ratios. 
Estimating the endogenous variables on all of the exogenous instruments, we have the 
following first-stage regressions: 
Inst i  o  1ESMi  2 ImGi  3EmGi  4FRi  Inst,i
Tradei  o  1FRi  2ESMi  3ImGeoi  4EmGeoi  Trade,i
Imi  o  1ImGeoi  2EmGeoi  3ESMi  4FRi  Im ,i
Emi  o  1EmGeoi  2ImGeoi  3ESMi  4FRi  Em ,i
 
 
 
 (7) 
where  ESM   are European settler mortality rates;  FR  is the Frankel-Romer index;  
ImGeo  Γ̂ I/Pop   and  EmGeo  Γ̂E /Pop   the exogenous migration rates calculated above; 
and the    's are the respective iid error terms. 
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3.3. Testing for the migration ‘Hump’ 
A key feature of our main model is that we estimate stocks—rather than flows—of 
foreign-born migrants. This characteristic is a direct consequence of the paper’s goal of 
extending the analysis to the whole world rather than restricting it to a small subset of rich 
countries. As was previously underlined, the majority of recent papers on the subject use the 
only existing reliable data on flows of international migrants to OECD countries. In contrast, 
we use the only comprehensive global database—the World Bank/Sussex Bilateral Matrix—
which provides estimates for stocks in or around the year 2000. The inclusion of controls, 
such as GDP per capita, life expectancy and educational attainment, reflect the widely-
viewed notion that absolute and relative levels of income and human development affect 
migration patterns. Their effects, however, are complex. As discussed earlier, the propensity 
to emigrate from a low-income country could increase with its level of income and/or 
development, at least up to a certain point. However, it is also possible that the relationship 
between the level of development and the propensity to attract migrants may be non-linear. 
When the poorest are able to migrate, they may only be able to move to other very poor 
countries since the barriers of moderately poor and rich countries are higher. However, once 
they have sufficiently high income to overcome these barriers, they may move to the 
wealthiest countries, essentially bypassing the middle income countries. As Klugman and 
Pereira (2009) show, many developing countries also have high barriers to migration. Once 
migrants have sufficient income to gain entrance to middle income countries, they may have 
the means to gain entrance to the wealthiest countries as well. All else equal, migrants would 
then tend to move to where income gains are greatest.  
3.4. Data and controls 
We investigate how geographic, demographic, cultural, political and economic factors 
affect the level and composition of the stock of international migrants living in a specific 
country and groups of countries. The dependent variable is the log of the bilateral stock or 
flow of migrants between 127 selected countries. The choice of controls rests on an analysis 
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of the current knowledge and literature on potential drivers of international migration 
(Yang, 2008; Massey, 1990; and Hatton and Williamson, 2002), as well as on the underlying 
assumptions of gravity models.  
3.4.1. Controls 
Geography 
Greater distance between two countries is expected to decrease the propensity of 
people to move between them, as costs to move tend to increase with distance. We also 
include dummy variables for countries that share a border and for landlocked countries. 
Bordering countries often share a unique relationship and tend to be closely linked 
politically, economically, and culturally. Migrants to or from landlocked countries also face 
unique constraints since they are unable to travel by water, a common way for people to 
travel cheaply over long distances. 
Demography, Culture and Living Standards 
Demographic factors can also influence migration patterns (Hatton and Williamson, 
1998, 2003). Differences in population density and age structure between countries are likely 
to have a significant impact on bilateral flows. For instance, countries with high fractions of 
non-working age populations may require more workers from abroad to counteract 
increasing dependency ratios, and pressure to out-migrate may be greater in countries with a 
high proportion of young adults. 
Countries that share a common language also tend to share other historical and 
cultural ties. These commonalities can help facilitate a migrant’s integration into the host 
society and labor market. Thus, countries where a potential migrant can already speak the 
local language become much more attractive destinations. After controlling for income, one 
could expect health and education to act as ‘pull’ factors. On the other hand, low health and 
education levels imply low levels of human capital among natives at destination, which may 
make migrants more competitive vis-à-vis natives in the labor market. 
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Political stability and governance 
Environments characterized by poor governance or political instability may induce 
people to move to countries where conditions are better. Politically driven migration 
scenarios may vary from families that flee violent conflict as refugees to those who seek 
countries where property rights are more secure or basic political freedoms are guaranteed. 
On the contrary, there are reasons we may also find that higher democracy leads to lower 
immigration as voters may be more likely than elites to resist immigration, particularly in 
labor-scarce countries. Moreover, barriers to immigration are more likely to be effective if 
the country has better institutions to enforce them.15  
Economy and Trade 
Particular characteristics of a nation’s economy may make it a more or less likely to be 
either a net sending or receiving country. Export controls attempt to estimate whether 
international migration is a substitute or a complement to trade. The contribution of the 
service sector to the national economy could be a pull factor, as countries with large service 
sectors may demand foreign labor. On the other hand, sectors such as services that do not 
compete internationally may have more organized labor movements and be better able to 
resist increased immigration. 
Measurement Issues 
Data on migration flows is also susceptible to more problems of measurement than 
stock data. While any cross-country comparison of migration data suffers from differing 
definitions of who is a migrant (some countries use place of birth while others use 
nationality), flow data also tends to omit both emigrants and irregular migrants. Stock data 
typically includes all migrants irrespective of their legal status, while OECD flows data only 
accounts for legal immigrants. As Ortega and Peri (2009) describe, flow data often poorly 
                                                 
15 In principle, this could be accounted for by controlling for immigration policies, as we do. However, our 
measure of policies is quite crude. We use an immigration policy index from the UNDESA Population Division’s 
World Population Policies 2007 (UN, 2008). The index takes only three values: -1 if policymakers support a 
reduction in immigration levels, 0 to maintain, and 1 to increase. 
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measures outflows since people who are leaving a country are less likely (or less likely to be 
required) to report exiting a country.  
4. Results 
4.1. The effect of development on migration 
Let us first discuss how development affects emigration. Recall that historical and 
contemporary data tend to show quite consistently that there exists a non-linear, inverted-U 
shaped relationship between development at origin and emigration. 
4.1.1. OLS  
Our OLS results confirm the existence of this relationship when origin income is 
allowed to pick up such non-linearity. The relationship appears to be robust as it continues to 
hold even after controlling for the effect of various geographic, demographic, historical, and 
policy variables. As shown in Table 1, the coefficients on origin income and origin income 
squared remain highly significant throughout regressions (1) to (5) as we progressively 
control for additional explanatory variables, and their respective signs confirm the inverted-
U shape. Furthermore, their magnitude does not appear to be greatly affected by the 
inclusion of these other controls.  
Figure 3 plots the emigration levels for varying income levels as predicted by the 
coefficients yielded by regressions (1)-(5). Countries with lower income fall on the upward 
sloping portion of the curve, while those with higher income fall on its downward sloping 
portion. We estimate that for roughly three-quarters of countries in our sample, higher 
income is associated with higher emigration. We also estimate that emigration reaches a 
maximum at an income level of around $14,500, which is higher than the GDP per capita of 
countries like Libya and Malaysia in 2007.  
To give a sense of the intensity of the relationship, in Table 3 we calculate the 
standardized coefficients corresponding to Table 1. The standardized coefficients provide an 
estimation of the magnitude of the change in emigration associated with a one standard 
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deviation change that a particular independent variable has on migrant stocks.16 
Standardized coefficients were calculated for income separately for countries located on 
either portion of the curve. The standardized coefficients for the OLS model suggest that 
among the set of relatively less developed countries (i.e., those located on the upward sloping 
portion of the hump) a rise in income by one standard deviation in an average sending 
country is associated with a 27% increase in the number of migrants located in an average 
destination country. For countries located on the downward portion of the hump, an 
increase in income is associated with a 6% decrease in emigration.  
This finding is interesting in itself. It suggests that if cross-sectional patterns are any 
indication of future trends, then we should expect that rising income in the vast majority of 
countries in the world will be associated with higher emigration in the foreseeable future, 
not the opposite. At this point, however, because of potential endogeneity, we are unable to 
tell whether this robust relationship between income at origin and emigration reflects a 
direct causal effect of the former on the latter. As described in Sections 1 and 3, we 
subsequently used ESM rates as instruments for income (and their squared terms for the 
squared income terms) in our regressions in order to address endogeneity concerns.  
4.1.2. Two­stage least squares 
First stage 
We first need to confirm that our instruments are valid. Following AJR (2001), we are 
confident that ESM rates are largely exogenous—in any event today’s levels of development 
and income cannot influence them. Subsequently, we need to check that they are correlated 
with income today. Table 2 reports the results of various variations of our first stage 
regressions. These results confirm that each of our four instrumental variables is strongly 
                                                 
16 We calculate the standardized coefficients of income for countries above and below each threshold as follows: 
sdi * [b(inci) + [ 2*b(inc2i) * meani]] 
where sd is the standard deviation of income (measured as the natural log of GDP per capita) below/above the threshold, 
b(inc) and b(inc2) are the OLS coefficients of income and income-squared, respectively, mean is the average of income 
below/above the threshold, and i denotes either origin or destination. Thus we have four standardized coefficients for 
income: origin-above, origin-below, destination-above, and destination-below. 
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correlated with the potentially endogenous income variable that it is used as an instrument 
for. Importantly, the statistical significance of the correlation is not subject to the inclusion 
or exclusion of institutional controls. In other words, our instruments affect income through 
other channels and mechanisms rather than present institutions. This is critical because, as 
we will see, the origin and destination ‘Rule of law’ variables drop out of our preferred IV 
specification, where we have retained only significant explanatory variables not present in 
the baseline specification. The data therefore tell us that present institutions do not have a 
separate effect on migration over and above that of current (instrumented) income. Finally, 
we are confident that we control for a sufficiently large set of variables that may impact 
emigration, so that the condition that our instruments be uncorrelated with the disturbance 
term is also likely met. 
Second stage regressions 
The results of our 2SLS regressions are reported in panel 2 of Table 1.17 Regressions 
(6) and (7) show that the inverted-U relationship survives the use of instruments for income. 
In these regressions with limited controls, the coefficients on the linear and quadratic origin 
income terms remain highly significant, and their respective signs continue to be consistent 
with an inverted-U shape. Our calculations yield that the ‘emigration-maximizing’ level of 
income according to this model and specification is around $6,000, which implies that 
roughly 40% of countries in our sample would fall on the downward-sloping portion of the 
hump.  
These initial results suggest the existence of a non-linear causal effect of income on 
emigration when controlling for destination income, population and distance alone. 
However, as more controls are added, the relationship loses statistical significance and 
eventually turns into a (statistically insignificant) largely upward sloping relationship. 
                                                 
17 We first ran a 2SLS regression including all controls in our data set. We then ran the same regression 
dropping the controls that were insignificant in the first and not included in our baseline model, 
Table 1 column (7). This latter regression is reported in Table 1 column (10) and is the focus of our analysis 
(when all controls are included, 'Failed Govt., Coups (Origin)’ is significant, but when limited controls are used, 
it becomes insignificant).  
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As we observe, the inclusion of three variables capture exogenous characteristics of 
the country-pair that account for the loss of significance of the effect of origin income. These 
variables are common border, common language, and former colonial relationship. The 
significance of these variables suggests that the apparent non-linear effect of income on 
migration is capturing the fact that middle income countries are also ‘near’ developed 
countries. These countries will therefore tend to have high emigration rates—because of 
their proximity to developed countries—and simultaneously be relatively developed, at least 
in comparison to other developing countries. In contrast, we also observe that the 
coefficients on destination income and destination income squared retain their significance 
with the inclusion of these additional controls in the fully-specified regression (10). This 
suggests that for most countries rising income leads to higher immigration levels. This latter 
result is consistent with the notion that as a country’s income rises, it becomes more 
attractive for migrants from other countries. And while the coefficients of destination 
income in (10) appear to suggest that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
destination income and migration, all of the countries in our sample fall below the income 
threshold on the upward-sloping part of the curve in the full specification. This pattern 
suggests that while there may be a decrease in the returns of destination income to 
immigration, the relationship is positive for all countries.  
Other factors associated with higher levels of development are also positively 
correlated with higher immigration levels and can be seen as acting as ‘pull factors’. For 
example, the negative coefficient on the share of population above 65 suggests that a lower 
share of working-age population tends to be associated with higher immigration levels. Our 
results also show that immigration policies matter: places where policy makers are more 
receptive to higher levels of immigration tend to be more popular destinations. Looking at 
the standardized coefficients for our preferred 2SLS estimation in Table 3, we note that the 
ten variables that have the largest impact on the size of bilateral stocks pertain to the country 
of destination.  
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In general, we find that destination country variables matter a great deal, but we 
caution that the interpretation of many of these additional variables can vary with 
adjustments in the specification and the selection of instruments. In order to show that this is 
the case, the third panel of Table 1 reruns the same regressions with an additional set of 
variables in the instrument set, namely a set of colony dummies. The argument in favor of 
these instruments is that former colonial status is likely to be related to development today 
and is clearly exogenous. Excludability is more questionable, although it is to a great extent 
attenuated by the fact that colony-colonizer dummies are included in the set of explanatory 
variables. What is important to note is that in this alternative specification the signs of 
several of the explanatory variables change—such as life expectancy, education, and 
democracy. However, what is important for our key coefficients of interest is that the 
inverted-U relationship between income and migration disappears once controls are 
introduced (in fact, the specification with the most controls actually delivers a negative 
linear relationship).  
4.2. The effect of migration on development 
Now that we have explored how income levels have both push and pull effects, we 
examine the effect migration itself has on income. As Rodrik, et al (2004) show, when 
comparing three widely analyzed channels of growth—trade, institutions, and geography—
while using instruments to control for endogeneity, the positive effect of institutions appears 
to dominate all other channels. Using a similar approach, we add migration into the 
equation—using geographical instruments—and observe whether migration plays a similar 
role in development. Felbermayr, Hiller, and Sala (2008) have performed a similar analysis 
finding a positive significant effect of migration on income, but include additional variables 
for market size and financial openness, whose exogeneity is questionable and fail to 
instrument for institutions.  
In contrast to Felbermayr, et al (2008), we closely follow the approach pioneered by 
Frankel and Romer (1999) and refined by Rodrik, et al (2004) in which income is regressed 
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only on exogenous variables. This is achieved either by using variables which are naturally 
exogenous (e.g., geography) or by instrumenting for endogenous variables. In such a strategy, 
omitted variable bias is not a concern: as we are certain of the exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables, any correlation between them and an omitted variable would reflect causality from 
the former to the latter. However, introducing endogenous controls in the regressions, as 
Felbermayr, et al (2008) do, can seriously bias the coefficient estimates on the exogenous 
variables.18 
In Table 4, we show the results of our estimations of GDP per capita on immigration, 
geography, institutions, and trade openness.19 Immigration is instrumented by the predicted 
values of a regression of the log of immigrant stocks on several exogenous geographical 
variables: log of bilateral distance, a dummy variable for a shared border, absolute latitude of 
the origin country, and dummy variables for origin and destination landlocked countries. 
Rule of law measures institutional quality and is instrumented by ESM rates. Trade openness 
is instrumented by the geography-based Frankel-Romer openness index. In the restricted 
sample, we use only countries with available ESM rates data.20 In the full sample, we set ESM 
rates equal to zero for former colonial powers and ex-Soviet countries. We focus our analysis 
on the full 2SLS estimations, (13)-(14).21 
While immigration enters positive and highly significant in the simpler 
specifications—as found by Felbermayr, et al (2008)—it becomes insignificant whenever 
institutions are accounted for. In the full 2SLS estimation, the effect of immigration vanishes 
with the addition of rule of law. Moreover, in the fully specified model, (16), its magnitude is 
                                                 
18 See Wooldridge (2002). 
19 In order to compare the magnitude of each variable’s effect, we standardize all regressors by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 
20 This sample is the same as that used by Rodrik, et al (2004). 
21 In addition to increasing the total number of observations, the power of the instruments appears stronger in 
the full sample. First-stage regressions, reported in Table 6, show our instruments to be valid for all endogenous 
variables except immigration in the restricted sample, (4). We also observe that not all of the endogenous 
variables have the expected relationship to the corresponding instruments, particularly emigration, (3) and (7). 
It may be the case that the Frankel-Romer index, which is also based on geographic variables, is capturing part 
of the effect the other instruments. 
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very small, indicating that even if there is an effect, its impact is negligible compared to the 
other channels. In  
Table 5 we find that emigration has an even less pronounced effect, while institutions 
continue to dominate, further confirming the results of Rodrik, et al (2004). In Table 5 we 
also include both immigration and emigration and find that their effect remains small and 
insignificant while institutions persist. Our results confirm the finding of Rodrik, et al (2004) 
that institutions trump other sources of growth after endogeneity is properly accounted for.  
In sum, we fail to find any conclusive evidence suggesting that migration has a 
substantial effect on development, much less one that rivals that of institutions.  
5. Conclusions 
Studies of the relationship between migration and development have traditionally had 
to deal with a set of distinct issues that hampered meaningful analysis. One is the need to 
properly account for the existence of a non-linear relationship between income and 
development, as suggested by many theoretical specifications. The second one is the need to 
take into account that migration decisions are affected by variables in both destination and 
origin countries and thus cannot be studied by the use of country aggregates that do not 
distinguish by both source and destination of migrants. A third issue is the need to study a 
process in which reasonable hypotheses about both directions of causation between 
development and income have been postulated.  
This paper has addressed these three issues by presenting empirical estimates of a 
gravity model of bilateral migration that properly accounts for non-linearities and tackles 
causality issues through an instrumental variables approach. In contrast to previous 
contributions in this literature, which were limited to migration to OECD countries, we have 
estimated the model using a matrix of bilateral migration stocks for 127 countries (Migration 
DRC, 2007), allowing us to properly take into account migration to developing countries 
which accounts for 49 percent of international migration. 
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This exercise delivers a set of interesting results. First, the inverted-U relationship (or 
‘migration hump’) between income at origin and income survives the more demanding 
bilateral stocks specification even after adding a large set of controls capturing conditions at 
home and destination as well as pair-specific variables. Second, although the relationship also 
survives in the basic IV estimation, it loses significance as we add more variables in the IV 
specification. Our two alternative IV specifications (which differ in the instrument list) 
deliver a similar message: the inverted-U does not survive the addition of controls for 
variables that capture the characteristics of destination economies or exogenous 
characteristics of the destination-origin pair. 
It is best to illustrate these results with an example. Consider the cases of Morocco, 
Turkey and Mexico, all three countries with moderate levels of development. The high 
emigration rates of these three countries (9.0, 4.2 and 8.1 percent, respectively, as opposed to 
a world average of 3 percent) appear to confirm the migration ‘hump’ hypothesis whereby 
emigration rates increase and then decline with development. But these three countries also 
border highly developed regions (the United States and Europe). Furthermore, their high 
levels of development (in comparison to other countries in their respective regions) may 
arguably be caused by their proximity to developed countries. We can only distinguish 
between the effect of proximity and the effect of development if we can convincingly have 
exogenous sources of variation in development, which we obtain through our IV techniques. 
Once we do that, we find that proximity sweeps out the effect of development in both of our 
specifications. So while it is true that countries with middle levels of development have 
greater emigration rates, this appears to be caused by their proximity (geographical and 
cultural) to developed countries rather than the development process. 
This paper has also studied the effect that migration has on both destination and 
origin country income by using geographically-induced differences across nations in 
immigration and emigration as sources of exogenous variations. In the spirit of Rodrik et al. 
(2004), we run a ‘horse-race’ between migration, institutions, trade and geography. While 
migration appears to have a significant effect in some of the simple specifications, its effect is 
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trumped by that of institutions, so that our preferred specification fails to find any significant 
effect of either immigration or emigration on income. This evidence supports the hypothesis 
that migration is best viewed from the standpoint of the scope that it offers to enhance 
individual opportunities rather than through its effect on aggregate economic performance. 
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Data sources 
We merge data on the estimated stocks of international migrants with information on 
geographic, cultural, institutional, socio-economic, and demographic factors from origin and 
destination countries. Our source for data on international migrants is the University of 
Sussex/World Bank Global Migrant Origin Database. This consists of a 226x226 bilateral 
matrix of origin and destination stocks derived from the 2000 round of national population 
censuses. We use the fourth version, which combines place of birth and citizenship reporting 
mechanisms to create the first single, complete matrix of worldwide international migrant 
stocks. The fourth version is also the most up-to-date version available at this time (March 
2007). Given the extensive list of independent variables required by our model (see below), 
we restrict the matrix size to 127x127 due to the limited data available for many of the 
smaller countries (i.e., New Caledonia and San Marino) as well as for irregular or politically 
complex countries (i.e., Afghanistan, North Korea, and West Bank and Gaza). Overall, this 
reduces the estimated sample size from 175 million to 166 million worldwide migrants (or 
95% of the estimated total). 
Data sources and summary statistics for all of the regressors used in the empirical 
model are documented in Appendices 1 and 2. Geographic and cultural information, 
including weighted distance between countries, common language, colonial ties, shared 
border, absolute latitude and whether a country is landlocked, comes from the Centre 
d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales (CEPII). Institutional measures come 
from a variety of sources: governance is based on the Rule of Law Index from Governance 
Matters VII, political instability is based on the Political Instability Task Force, democracy is 
based on the Polity IV Index and immigration policy is based on the World Population 
Policies from the United Nations. Regarding socio-economic data, GDP per capita and 
exports and services as a percentage of GDP are derived from the World Development 
Indicators; life expectancy and the education index are derived from the United Nations; and 
economic freedom is based on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. 
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Finally, all demographic variables, including total population, the age structure of the 
population, population density and urban population, are derived from the United Nations 
Population Division. All independent variables correspond to the average value for the 1991-
2000 period.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Non-linearity of migration and income, theoretical 
 
Figure 2: Non-linearity of migration and income, empirical: Emigrant share of population 
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Figure 3: Emigration predicted by origin income, OLS 
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Table 1: Bilateral migration equation estimates, OLS and 2SLS 
Ln(Stocks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Log of Distance ‐1.316 ‐1.266 ‐1.016 ‐1.064 ‐1.053 ‐1.349 ‐1.3 ‐0.962 ‐0.893 ‐0.54 ‐1.31 ‐1.193 ‐0.905 ‐0.909 ‐1.318
[0.0215]*** [0.0226]*** [0.0222]*** [0.0169]*** [0.0232]*** [0.0240]*** [0.0246]*** [0.0253]*** [0.0662]*** [0.194]*** [0.0230]*** [0.0260]*** [0.0262]*** [0.0632]*** [0.0443]***
Log of population (Origin) 0.589 0.648 0.627 0.596 0.63 0.61 0.666 0.633 0.618 0.587 0.586 0.657 0.638 0.634 0.742
[0.0115]*** [0.0109]*** [0.0103]*** [0.00627]*** [0.0100]*** [0.0128]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0316]*** [0.0404]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0128]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0318]*** [0.0349]***
Log of population (Dest.) 0.799 0.777 0.662 0.899 0.799 0.762 0.596 0.328 0.759 0.739 0.578 0.794
[0.0108]*** [0.0102]*** [0.00619]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0115]*** [0.0443]*** [0.268] [0.0135]*** [0.0131]*** [0.0333]*** [0.0330]***
Log of GDP per cap. (Origin) 2.22 2.317 2.39 1.778 2.393 7.044 6.696 1.086 ‐2.166 ‐0.88 1.293 1.042 0.658 0.439 ‐5.523
[0.188]*** [0.181]*** [0.172]*** [0.119]*** [0.165]*** [1.053]*** [1.040]*** [0.979] [2.628] [3.188] [0.736]* [0.830] [0.829] [1.882] [2.559]**
Log of GDP per cap. Sq. (Origin) ‐0.119 ‐0.121 ‐0.125 ‐0.096 ‐0.125 ‐0.409 ‐0.384 ‐0.041 0.158 0.077 ‐0.0621 ‐0.0413 ‐0.0144 0.00153 0.218
[0.0112]*** [0.0107]*** [0.0101]*** [0.00703]***[0.00972]*** [0.0632]*** [0.0624]*** [0.0587] [0.158] [0.192] [0.0439] [0.0495] [0.0494] [0.112] [0.154]
Log of GDP per cap. (Dest.) ‐5.579 ‐5.538 ‐4.507 ‐5.839 ‐4.955 ‐10.12 ‐39.06 49.07 ‐16.41 ‐16.99 ‐45.87 ‐37.87
[0.169]*** [0.163]*** [0.123]*** [0.206]*** [0.885]*** [0.856]*** [7.338]*** [20.40]** [0.635]*** [0.616]*** [4.214]*** [2.732]***
Log of GDP per cap. Sq. (Dest.) 0.362 0.359 0.294 0.357 0.32 0.636 1.773 ‐2.182 1.012 1.051 2.161 2.172
[0.0101]*** [0.00969]***[0.00718]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0532]*** [0.0514]*** [0.357]*** [0.964]** [0.0380]*** [0.0368]*** [0.179]*** [0.163]***
Life Expectancy (Dest.) 0.0212 0.0272 0.546 ‐0.503 0.591 0.178
[0.00249]***[0.00368]*** [0.0988]*** [0.205]** [0.0774]*** [0.0150]***
Population under 14 (%) (Dest.) 3.204 10.08 ‐19.35 39 ‐17.58 ‐6.702
[0.212]*** [0.566]*** [4.505]*** [11.78]*** [4.442]*** [2.073]***
Urban Population (%) (Dest.) 0.823 0.631 22.01 ‐14.79 22.52 2.287
[0.0768]*** [0.126]*** [3.881]*** [6.123]** [3.443]*** [0.387]***
Population over 65 (%) (Dest.) 17.01 51.58 ‐37.22
[1.140]*** [26.29]** [5.975]***
Services/GDP (Dest.) 2.205 ‐16.03 6.374
[0.202]*** [7.837]** [0.525]***
Exports/GDP (Dest.) 0.982 ‐7.082 1.736
[0.0852]*** [3.605]** [0.250]***
Polity IV (Dest.) ‐0.0413 ‐0.3 0.0242
[0.00409]*** [0.106]*** [0.00856]***
Education Index (Dest.) 1.539 ‐8.066 3.694
[0.149]*** [3.719]** [0.365]***
Log of population density (Dest.) ‐0.215 1.25 ‐0.585
[0.0135]*** [0.570]** [0.0392]***
Immigration Policy (Dest.) 0.0435 1.28 0.073
[0.0390] [0.530]** [0.0734]
Common Border 1.99 1.601 1.858 2.198 1.83 3.295 2.411 1.848 1.324
[0.126]*** [0.104]*** [0.123]*** [0.140]*** [0.304]*** [0.640]*** [0.152]*** [0.317]*** [0.196]***
Former Colony of Dest/Origin 1.971 2.164 1.913 1.766 1.826 1.88 1.597 1.83 1.971
[0.144]*** [0.114]*** [0.141]*** [0.153]*** [0.322]*** [0.354]*** [0.165]*** [0.331]*** [0.189]***
Common Language 1.276 1.105 1.238 1.263 2.101 0.724 1.234 2.068 1.387
[0.0515]*** [0.0354]*** [0.0514]*** [0.0538]*** [0.219]*** [0.327]** [0.0599]*** [0.221]*** [0.0825]***
Failed Govt., Coups (Dest.) 0.0979 0.334 ‐0.53
[0.0410]** [0.176]* [0.0791]***
Failed Govt., Coups (Origin) 0.0746 0.214 0.111
[0.0381]* [0.144] [0.0913]
Constant ‐3.804 2.214 ‐0.00975 ‐0.918 ‐7.281 ‐23.41 ‐17.84 23.05 158 ‐220.7 ‐0.129 51.09 52.33 172.9 158.6
[0.826]*** [1.092]** [1.039] [0.716] [1.284]*** [4.309]*** [5.716]*** [5.399]*** [33.44]*** [81.45]*** [3.042] [4.389]*** [4.339]*** [19.76]*** [16.23]***
Observations 20,757 14,713 14,713 28,070 14,713 20,757 14,713 14,713 14,713 14,713 20,757 14,713 14,713 14,713 14,713
R‐squared 0.231 0.498 0.546 0.532 0.578 0.206 0.476 0.518 0.23 0.365 0.39
OLS 2SLS 2SLS with former colony dummies
Dependent variable is the natural log of bilateral stocks between countries. In columns (6)‐(10), the 2SLS regressions use European Settler Mortality Rates and their squares for origin and destination countries as instruments. We first ran a 2SLS 
regression including all controls in our data set. We then ran the same regression dropping the controls that were insignificant in the first and not included in our baseline model, column (7). This latter regression is reported in column (10) and 
is the focus of our analysis (when all controls are included, 'Failed Govt., Coups (Origin) is significant, but when limited controls are used, it becomes insignificant). We then perform these same regressions using dummies for origin and 
destination for former colonies in columns (11)‐(15). First‐stage regressions are reported in Table 2. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2: Bilateral migration equation estimates, 2SLS first stage regressions 
Origin 
income
Origin 
income sq. Dest. income
Dest. 
income sq.
Origin 
income
Origin 
income sq. Dest. income
Dest. 
income sq.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Origin Log of ESM (Origin) 0.0147 ‐0.0911 0.00287 0.0289 ‐0.0674 ‐1.562 ‐0.00267 ‐0.0914
[0.00714]** [0.113] [0.00451] [0.0747] [0.0108]*** [0.181]*** [0.00474] [0.0812]
Origin Log of ESM Sq. (Origin) ‐0.0315 ‐0.439 ‐0.000491 ‐0.00549 ‐0.0427 ‐0.639 0.000232 0.00997
[0.00120]*** [0.0188]*** [0.000730] [0.0121] [0.00184]*** [0.0303]*** [0.000770] [0.0133]
Destination Log of ESM (Dest.) ‐0.00715 ‐0.108 0.0152 0.446 ‐0.0268 ‐0.459 0.0131 0.401
[0.00922] [0.148] [0.00655]** [0.104]*** [0.0127]** [0.215]** [0.00668]* [0.108]***
Destination Log of ESM Sq. (Dest.) 0.000517 0.00787 ‐0.0051 ‐0.121 0.00221 0.0383 ‐0.00407 ‐0.0984
[0.00142] [0.0229] [0.00102]*** [0.0161]*** [0.00197] [0.0335] [0.000988]*** [0.0156]***
Origin Former Colony (Origin)
Destination Former Colony (Dest.)
Rule of Law (Origin) 0.759 13.59 ‐0.00132 ‐0.0194
[0.00474]*** [0.0787]*** [0.00387] [0.0644]
Rule of Law (Dest.) ‐0.000402 ‐0.00355 0.277 5.956
[0.00983] [0.158] [0.00555]*** [0.0948]***
Log of Distance 0.0226 0.314 ‐0.0177 ‐0.221 0.0564 0.919 ‐0.00731 0.00329
[0.00707]*** [0.115]*** [0.00471]*** [0.0792]*** [0.00976]*** [0.167]*** [0.00496] [0.0864]
Common Border 0.0645 0.971 ‐0.0551 ‐0.735 ‐0.0931 ‐1.852 ‐0.0815 ‐1.304
[0.0364]* [0.578]* [0.0207]*** [0.343]** [0.0480]* [0.806]** [0.0219]*** [0.376]***
Common Language 0.0627 0.979 0.0333 0.506 0.309 5.387 0.0777 1.466
[0.0169]*** [0.275]*** [0.0110]*** [0.181]*** [0.0215]*** [0.363]*** [0.0116]*** [0.198]***
Former Colony of Dest/Origin 0.0446 0.751 ‐0.0333 ‐0.64 0.165 2.9 ‐0.0337 ‐0.647
[0.0338] [0.546] [0.0210] [0.356]* [0.0467]*** [0.807]*** [0.0225] [0.393]*
Failed Govt., Coups (Origin) ‐0.236 ‐3.199 ‐0.00247 ‐0.0327 ‐0.923 ‐15.51 0.000554 0.0243
[0.0128]*** [0.202]*** [0.00744] [0.124] [0.0146]*** [0.238]*** [0.00695] [0.120]
Log of population (Origin) ‐0.000825 0.0941 0.000716 0.0106 ‐0.0201 ‐0.251 0.000897 0.0143
[0.00376] [0.0628] [0.00196] [0.0327] [0.00469]*** [0.0806]*** [0.00208] [0.0358]
Failed Govt., Coups (Dest.) ‐0.00285 ‐0.0451 0.0461 1.06 ‐0.00721 ‐0.124 ‐0.0153 ‐0.262
[0.0129] [0.209] [0.00783]*** [0.127]*** [0.0177] [0.302] [0.00761]** [0.123]**
Polity IV (Dest.) ‐0.000323 ‐0.00449 0.0122 0.172 ‐0.00129 ‐0.0218 0.0204 0.348
[0.00117] [0.0189] [0.000829]*** [0.0133]*** [0.00157] [0.0268] [0.000801]*** [0.0129]***
Life Expectancy (Dest.) 8.06E‐05 0.00162 0.0265 0.354 0.000313 0.00589 0.0342 0.522
[0.00116] [0.0187] [0.000995]*** [0.0160]*** [0.00156] [0.0265] [0.00109]*** [0.0184]***
Education Index (Dest.) ‐0.0364 ‐0.539 0.691 11.26 ‐0.0956 ‐1.603 0.44 5.846
[0.0478] [0.769] [0.0334]*** [0.535]*** [0.0646] [1.097] [0.0358]*** [0.595]***
Exports/GDP (Dest.) ‐0.00629 ‐0.105 0.665 11.4 ‐0.0197 ‐0.343 0.821 14.76
[0.0247] [0.398] [0.0156]*** [0.250]*** [0.0333] [0.566] [0.0160]*** [0.273]***
Services/GDP (Dest.) ‐0.0227 ‐0.341 1.114 16.65 ‐0.112 ‐1.931 1.728 29.87
[0.0663] [1.067] [0.0508]*** [0.855]*** [0.0870] [1.479] [0.0537]*** [0.926]***
Log of population (Dest.) ‐0.00167 ‐0.0253 0.0635 1.131 ‐0.00323 ‐0.0531 0.0693 1.255
[0.00369] [0.0595] [0.00247]*** [0.0423]*** [0.00512] [0.0870] [0.00261]*** [0.0463]***
Population under 14 (%) (Dest.) ‐0.0401 ‐0.742 0.494 20.54 ‐0.202 ‐3.648 0.592 22.65
[0.187] [3.015] [0.110]*** [1.750]*** [0.260] [4.428] [0.114]*** [1.903]***
Population over 65 (%) (Dest.) 0.0316 0.0272 3.863 97.8 ‐0.125 ‐2.739 6.705 159
[0.376] [6.057] [0.225]*** [3.746]*** [0.505] [8.581] [0.221]*** [3.811]***
Log of population density (Dest.) 0.000333 0.00372 ‐0.0764 ‐1.113 ‐0.00251 ‐0.0474 ‐0.0844 ‐1.285
[0.00409] [0.0659] [0.00246]*** [0.0398]*** [0.00566] [0.0961] [0.00265]*** [0.0454]***
Urban Population (%) (Dest.) ‐0.0124 ‐0.21 1.229 20.52 ‐0.0232 ‐0.405 1.172 19.27
[0.0369] [0.594] [0.0329]*** [0.558]*** [0.0512] [0.870] [0.0343]*** [0.592]***
Immigration Policy (Dest.) ‐0.00262 ‐0.0337 ‐0.132 ‐2.292 ‐0.0122 ‐0.205 ‐0.117 ‐1.973
[0.0116] [0.188] [0.00784]*** [0.130]*** [0.0161] [0.274] [0.00877]*** [0.152]***
Constant 8.856 78.07 3.615 ‐9.509 9.629 91.9 2.513 ‐33.23
[0.171]*** [2.765]*** [0.104]*** [1.720]*** [0.228]*** [3.888]*** [0.105]*** [1.827]***
Observations 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002
R‐squared 0.774 0.793 0.911 0.913 0.562 0.552 0.9 0.895
F test: ESM variables=0 1494 1397 12.25 20.14 2934 2862 8.136 14.71
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Gravity model standardized coefficients 
Type Variable
Effect on 
Emigration 
Rate
Type Variable
Effect on 
Emigration 
Rate
Destination GDP per capita, above 0.66 Destination GDP per capita, below 16.08
Destination Total Population 0.47 Destination Life Expectancy ‐1.85
Origin Total Population 0.39 Destination Population 0‐14 (%) 1.46
Destination GDP per capita, below ­0.34 Destination Urban Population (%) ‐1.18
Relationship Weighted‐distance ‐0.29 Destination Population 65+ (%) 0.84
Origin GDP per capita, below 0.27 Destination Services (% of GDP) ‐0.75
Destination Population 0‐14 (%) 0.19 Destination Exports (% of GDP) ‐0.68
Relationship Common Language 0.14 Destination Polity IV Index ‐0.62
Destination Services (% of GDP) 0.12 Destination Education Index ‐0.62
Destination Polity IV Index ‐0.11 Destination Population density 0.62
Destination Education Index 0.09 Origin GDP per capita, above 0.52
Destination Population 65+ (%) 0.08 Origin Total Population 0.31
Relationship Colony 0.08 Destination Immigration Policy 0.20
Relationship Border 0.08 Relationship Border 0.18
Destination Life Expectancy 0.07 Destination Total Population 0.18
Origin GDP per capita, above ­0.06 Relationship Weighted‐distance ‐0.16
Destination Population density ‐0.05 Relationship Colony 0.08
Destination Urban Population (%) 0.04 Relationship Common Language 0.08
Destination Immigration Policy ‐0.03 Destination War and Govt. Failure 0.05
Destination Exports (% of GDP) 0.02 Origin War and Govt. Failure 0.03
Origin War and Govt. Failure 0.01 Origin GDP per capita, below 0.00
Destination War and Govt. Failure 0.00 Destination GDP per capita, above ­­
OLS 2SLS
Reported are the standardized coefficients corresponding to regressions (5) and (10) in Table 1 and listed in descending order of 
absolute magnitude. Standardized coefficients for income are calculated separately for countries on the upward and downward 
sloping parts of the curve. In the 2SLS specification, all countries fall below the destination income threshold and are on the upward 
sloping part of the curve, thus there is no value for 'Destination GDP per capita, above'.
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Table 4: Migration and income 
 
Table 5: Migration and income, additional specifications 
 
Ln(GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Immigration 0.727 0.634 0.275 0.217 0.64 0.953 ‐1.6 ‐0.0274 0.7 0.451 0.142 0.11 0.715 0.503 ‐0.859 ‐0.00682
[0.138]*** [0.134]*** [0.142]* [0.140] [0.577] [0.595] [1.977] [2.644] [0.0969]*** [0.0921]*** [0.0807]* [0.0790] [0.187]*** [0.167]*** [0.828] [0.791]
Distance from the Equator 0.523 0.227 0.337 0.478 ‐0.565 ‐0.667 0.477 0.216 0.214 0.612 ‐0.747 ‐0.867
[0.115]*** [0.128]* [0.132]** [0.125]*** [0.479] [0.463] [0.0646]*** [0.0578]*** [0.0571]*** [0.0615]*** [0.624] [0.641]
Rule of law 0.499 0.43 2.022 1.704 0.599 0.599 2.236 2.209
[0.107]*** [0.109]*** [0.993]** [0.957]* [0.0534]*** [0.0532]*** [0.991]** [0.968]**
Trade openness 0.163 ‐0.309 0.0568 ‐0.445
[0.0873]* [0.318] [0.0545] [0.386]
Constant ‐0.155 0.128 0.00352 0.084 ‐0.178 0.186 ‐0.518 ‐0.35 0.111 0.0322 0.0123 0.016 0.157 0.175 ‐0.328 ‐0.314
[0.1000] [0.0841] [0.0800] [0.0826] [0.169] [0.147] [0.475] [0.521] [0.0791] [0.0697] [0.0540] [0.0533] [0.0872]* [0.0636]*** [0.270] [0.260]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 125 125 125 125 107 107 107 107
R‐squared 0.229 0.375 0.504 0.53 0.213 0.461 0.691 0.694
Dependent variable is the natural log of GDP per capita. Immigration is measured as the immigrant share of population. ESMR, the Frankel‐Romer openness index, and the geographic component of immigration are used as 
instruments for rule of law, trade openness, and immigration, respectively. See Table 6 for first‐stage regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Restricted sample Full sample
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Emigration 0.186 0.277 ‐0.329 0.0106 ‐0.544 1.152 0.386 ‐1.889 0.724 0.391 ‐0.725 0.00805 1.433 ‐0.0622 ‐0.572 0.0588
[0.156] [0.122]** [0.410] [0.530] [2.045] [13.81] [8.292] [44.54] [0.489] [0.217]* [0.744] [0.958] [1.137] [0.164] [0.583] [0.798]
Immigration 2.67 ‐2.965 ‐3.503 9.971 ‐0.812 0.574 ‐0.207 ‐0.0507
[7.709] [46.73] [40.24] [246.5] [2.016] [0.209]*** [0.569] [0.488]
Distance from the Equator 0.619 ‐0.526 ‐0.667 1.056 ‐0.613 ‐0.473 0.698 ‐0.877 ‐0.865 0.6 ‐0.855 ‐0.859
[0.142]*** [0.460] [0.452] [6.818] [1.392] [5.974] [0.0670]*** [0.834] [0.685] [0.0610]*** [0.752] [0.648]
Rule of law 1.631 1.694 2.491 ‐0.729 2.209 2.204 2.228 2.209
[0.554]*** [0.511]*** [10.08] [61.48] [1.124]* [0.939]** [1.102]** [0.959]**
Trade openness ‐0.316 ‐0.442 ‐0.449 ‐0.457
[0.306] [4.735] [0.506] [0.481]
Constant ‐0.317 0.062 ‐0.239 ‐0.346 0.269 ‐0.321 ‐0.851 1.352 0.157 0.163 ‐0.314 ‐0.312 0.138 0.175 ‐0.323 ‐0.314
[0.0966]*** [0.101] [0.206] [0.234] [1.705] [5.982] [6.981] [41.84] [0.145] [0.0790]** [0.275] [0.248] [0.293] [0.0689]** [0.275] [0.258]
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Two‐stage least squares regressions. Dependent variable is the natural log of GDP per capita. Immigration and emigration are measured as the immigrant and emigrant share of population, respectively. ESMR, the Frankel‐Romer 
openness index, and the geographic component of immigration and emigration are used as instruments for rule of law, trade openness, and emigration, respectively. See Table 6 for first‐stage regressions. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. Significance indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Restricted sample Full sample
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Table 6: Migration and income, 2SLS first stage regressions 
 
Rule of Law
Trade 
openness
Emigration Immigration Rule of Law
Trade 
openness
Emigration Immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ESMR ‐0.327 ‐0.261 ‐0.113 ‐0.105 ‐0.3 ‐0.119 ‐0.168 ‐0.132
[0.113]*** [0.0993]** [0.0903] [0.102] [0.157]* [0.148] [0.149] [0.118]
Frankel‐Romer 0.129 0.8 0.178 0.0753 0.116 0.707 0.169 0.0767
[0.125] [0.117]*** [0.0856]** [0.143] [0.125] [0.106]*** [0.0774]** [0.0973]
Immigration, geo 2.333 2.103 10.93 2.477 0.323 ‐0.132 ‐0.52 1.236
[3.364] [1.649] [4.806]** [3.716] [0.453] [0.313] [0.887] [0.326]***
Emigration, geo ‐2.12 ‐2.026 ‐9.929 ‐2.24 ‐0.242 0.15 0.836 ‐0.945
[3.228] [1.570] [4.537]** [3.570] [0.502] [0.289] [0.769] [0.364]**
Distance from Equator 0.548 ‐0.143 0.173 0.142 0.455 ‐0.134 ‐0.177 0.0649
[0.175]*** [0.148] [0.0891]* [0.108] [0.147]*** [0.139] [0.154] [0.0981]
Constant 0.122 ‐0.13 0.21 ‐0.105 0.195 ‐0.122 ‐0.0349 ‐0.0488
[0.150] [0.108] [0.127] [0.121] [0.0848]** [0.0742] [0.106] [0.0629]
Observations 79 79 79 79 108 107 108 108
R‐squared 0.413 0.597 0.49 0.116 0.503 0.525 0.227 0.249
F‐test 10.16 25 5.946 1.464 30.73 29.06 5.712 24.3
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Restricted sample Full sample
Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A1: Sources 
 
Dependent Variables
Log of migrant stocks in world University of Sussex/World Bank Global 
Migrant Origin Database, 2000
The reference period is the 2000 round of 
population censuses
Log of inflow of foreign population in 
OECD country
OECD International Migration Database, 1996‐
2005 average
Foreign population is defined by nationality
Log of stock of foreign population in 
OECD country
OECD International Migration Database, 1996‐
2005 average
Foreign population is defined by nationality
Independent Variables
Country Pair
Log of weighted distance between 
countries 
Centre D'Etudes Prospectives et D'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)
Bilateral distances between biggest cities 
weighted by population
Common language CEPII 1 if language is spoken by at least 9% of the 
population in both countries
Colony CEPII 1 if long period of colonial relationship with 
substantial participation in the governance of 
the colonized country
Shared border CEPII 1 if shared border
Geographic 
Absolute latitude CEPII
Landlocked CEPII 1 if country is landlocked
Institutional
Governance: Rule of law index Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996‐07
‐2.5 to 2.5 where 2.5 = best governance
Political instability Political Instability Task Force, Historical State 
Armed Conflicts and Regime Crises, 1955‐2007
1 if country experienced war, genocide, 
politicide and/or adverse regime change during 
time period
Democracy: Polity IV index Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800‐2007
‐10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy)
Policy on immigration level World Population Policies 2007, United Nations 
Population Division
‐1 (lower), 0 (no intervention or maintain), +1 
(raise)
Socio­economic
Log of GDP per capita World Development Indicators (WDI) Constant PPP‐adjusted 2005 international $
Life expectancy at birth World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision, 
United Nations Population Division
Total years
Education index United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report Office
Combination of literacy and gross enrolment 
ratio. 0‐1 where 1 is 100% literacy and 
enrolment
Exports of goods and services WDI % of GDP
Services, etc., value added WDI % of GDP
Economic freedom Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom 
0‐100 where 100 represents maximum freedom
Demographic
Log of total population World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision, 
United Nations Population Division
Population under 15 Ibid % of total
Population over 64 Ibid % of total
Population density Ibid for total population; CEPII for country area Sq. km.
Urban population World Urbanization Prospects: 2007 Revis‐ion, 
United Nations Population Division
% of total
Additional Information
Countries not included in the sample 
due to lack of data
Methodology to interpolate missing 
data for countries in the sample
Units and coding
Notes
Andorra, Afghanistan, Netherlands Antilles, American Samoa, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Channel 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Faeroe Islands, Micronesia, Greenland, Guam, Isle of Man, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Mayotte, New Caledonia, Palau, Puerto Rico, 
Democratic Republic of North Korea, French Polynesia, San Marino, Timor‐Leste, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and West Bank and Gaza
Missing values were calculated by taking the average value of the variable for countries with 
similar HDI scores (+/‐ 10 places when possible)
Source
Source
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bilateral stocks 32,580 5,103 78,933 0 9,336,719
Absolute latitude 181 25.90 16.73 0.23 64.15
Landlocked 181 0.19 0.40 0 1
Rule of Law 181 ‐0.08 0.97 ‐2.20 2.02
Polity IV Index 181 2.57 6.20 ‐10 10
War and Govt. Failure 181 0.28 0.45 0 1
Immigration Policy 181 ‐0.29 0.45 ‐1 1
Ln GDP per capita 181 8.38 1.29 5.38 11.08
Life Expectancy 181 65.4 10.3 29.8 80.0
Education Index 181 0.74 0.20 0.12 0.99
Exports (% of GDP) 181 38.2% 25.8% 1.1% 212.3%
Services (% of GDP) 181 51.7% 13.5% 14.8% 83.9%
Total Population 181 15.54 1.95 10.63 20.91
Population 0‐14 (%) 181 32.8% 10.5% 2.8% 49.7%
Population 65+ (%) 181 6.5% 4.3% 1.0% 17.4%
Urban population 181 51.3% 23.3% 7.3% 100.0%
Population density 181 4.02 1.51 0.38 8.65
ESMR 127 2.90 2.47 0.00 7.99
